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10 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PRM-29 (Classification System Review) Meeting

1. The second meeting of the ad hoc committee established by PRM-29 to review the security classification system and draft an Executive Order to replace E.O. 11652 was held on 10 June 1977. attended for CIA; I for the Three sub-groups each of the two working groups were IC Staff. established to deal with specific issues. Attachment A lists those for the working group on Classification/Declassification. Attachment B lists those under the Implementation and Review working group. Sub-groups C/D-1 and I/R-3 are of key interest to the Intelligence Community. The first will deal with what information should be protected, for how long, and identified by what criteria. Jeffrey Smith, State, is to chair it. The first meeting is set for Monday, 13 June. The second (Sub-group I/R-3) will deal with compartmentation and personnel security criteria for granting access to sensitive information. Art Van Cook, Defense, is to chair it. (NOTE: He has long been an opponent of Intelligence Community practices on compartmentation and personnel security.) The other sub-groups will deal with declassification time frames and criteria; systems and structures for monitoring the new classification policies; and means of disciplining those who abuse security classifications. I asked whether the stated composition of these sub-groups was exclusive. Bob Gates, NSC Staff, stated that all departments and agencies represented on the ad hoc committee could send representatives to any of the sub-groups. Attachment C gives a schedule, admittedly tight, for the sub-groups and working groups to complete their assignments and submit option papers. The first sub-group meetings are scheduled for Monday morning, 13 June.

2. Bob Wells, ICRC, said that several sections of E.O. 11652 should be reviewed by the sub-groups as follows:

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Sub-group	E.O. 11652 Sections to be Reviewed
C/D 1	1, 2, 4, 8, 10 (classification categories, who may classify, classifying procedures, Atomic Energy Act material, and exceptional cases)
C/D-2	5, 11, 12 (downgrading and declassification, Presidential papers, historical research)
C/D-3	3, 5, 12 (authority to downgrade and declassify, 5 and 12 as stated above)
I/R-1	6 and 7 (access and marking, implementation and review)
I/R-2	13 (disciplinary action)
I/R-3	9 (compartmentation)

Mr. Wells brought up for discussion and decision three issues listed on Attachment D. Bob Gates and Rick Neustadt agreed to consult with the White House Counsel, and then possibly with Congressional contacts, on whether the new Order should speak to the provision of classified information to the Congress. It was agreed that the question of policy on providing classified information to foreign governments would be taken up by Subgroup C/D-1; and that the question of standardization of administrative matters would be deferred to the implementation stage.

- 3. Bob Gates, NSC Staff, asked for comments on how best to implement the new Order. Discussion showed that no one wanted the Order to contain details. It was agreed that the question of who should write the implementer should be deferred (Mr. Gates commented that such could possibly be an NSC Staff project).
- 4. Messrs. Wells and Van Cook distributed for information a strawman of a new Order, together with a summary of its provisions (totalling 37 pages). The general thrust of their proposal favors disclosure as opposed to protection. Longterm (past 20 years) classification protection of information would be sharply restricted.

5.	Following	the	meeting,	,		and I re	ache	d	
tentative	agreement	on	which Su	ıb-groups	we	believed	CIA	and	the

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IC Staff would want to concentrate their efforts on. We agreed that both would be quite interested in C/D-1; that CIA would have the only substantive interest in C/D-2; that while both would be interested in C/D-3, CIA chairmanship thereof would relieve the pressure on the IC Staff to participate; that both would be interested in I/R-1; that since I/R-2 would deal with legal issues, only CIA would be involved; and while both had a key interst in I/R-3, the IC Staff's concern was primary.

 DCI	Security	Commi	ı ttee

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Attachments: as stated